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Abstract
This study looked at the relationship between rhetorical sensitivity, locus of control 
and religiosity amongst college students at three fundamentally different college institutions. 
Data were collected from 235 students. Results revealed that students belonging to the most 
religiously fundamental group have significant differences from students outside that same 
group. A major finding was discovery of a positive relationship between rhetorical 
reflectomess and fundamental religiosity as well as a negative relationship between rhetorical 
sensitivity and fundamental religiosity. Also a significant but modest relationship was found 
between external locus of control and rhetorical sensitivity and between internal locus of 
control and noble selfness.
IV
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Review of Literature 4
Rhetorical Sensitivity 4
Noble Self 5
Rhetorical Reflectors 7
Tenants of Rhetorical Sensitivity 8
Relationship between Rhetorical Sensitivity to other Constructs 10 
Rhetorical Sensitivity and Religiosity 13
Locus of Control 14
Definition of Construct 15
Causation Theory 17
Deterministic Heritage 19
Religiosity and Locus of Control 23
Religiosity 27
Problems inherent in Defining Religiosity 27
Operationalization of Religiosity 29
One-Fold Typology 30
Two-Fold Typology 31
Three-Fold Typology 32
Four-Fold Typology 33
Five-Fold Typology 34
Statement of Purpose 36
Chapter 2 Methodology 40
Chapter 3 Results 45
Chapter 4 Discussion 69
Conclusion 78
Implications 78
Limitations 78
Recommendations 80
References 82
Appendix 90
VList of Tables
Table 1 Self-reported socio-demographic characteristics of participants 46
Table 2 Denominational Re-Grouping Based on Similar Doctrinal Position 48
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for RHETSEN (RS, NS, RR) 48
Locus of Control Inventory (LC) and Inventory of Religious Beliefs (REL)
Table 4 Pearson Correlations between RS, NS, RR, LC, and REL 49
Table 5 One-way Analyses of Variance for four levels o f religiosity 50
Table 6 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on religiosity 52
Table 7 Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Sensitivity 54
Table 8 Stepwise Regression Analysis for Noble Self 55
Table 9 Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Reflector 56
Table 10 One-way Analyses o f Variance for Institution Attended 57
Table 11 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Institution attended 58
Table 12 One-way Analyses of Variance for Class Rank 59
Table 13 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Class Rank 60
Table 14 One-way Analyses of Variance for declared major 61
Table 15 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on declared major. 62
Table 16 One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency of church attendance 63
Table 17 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance 64
Table 18 Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance 65
Table 19 One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency based on denominational type 66
Table 20Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Religiosity based on Denominational Type 67
Table 21 Independent samples t-test for gender 68
Chapter 1 
Introduction
“Down to earth,” “gullible,” “doesn’t think before he speaks,” “fundamental,” 
“egotistical,” “dogmatic,” “lucky,” “argumentative,” “ultra-conservative,” “goody- 
goody,” “It must be fate!” “atheistic,” “open-minded,” “I think I can,” “right-wing,” 
“holier-than-thou...” These are terms that are used to describe people or situations. 
They have become stereotypical tags to describe behaviors, but do not usually reach 
beyond the surface. For someone to earn one of the above labels, there is probably 
something happening internally that leads others to perceive that person in such a way. 
What leads to the perception is based, in part, on the observer’s own previous 
programming and attitudes. For instance, I might consider you to be offensive, but 
someone else may consider me to be offensive. Perceptions lead to conclusions, 
whether or not they are accurate. Unless we can measure and quantify the behaviors 
and mind sets that lead to the labels, the perceptions can and will only remain on the 
surface.
This thesis is about the relationship of three constructs and the complex matrix 
that links the mind sets together. This study is about interpersonal communication 
based on how an individual (specifically a college student) perceives himself or herself 
in terms of attitudes toward encoding messages, internal/external control, and 
religiosity.
Rhetorical sensitivity is a measure of one’s attitudes toward encoding messages. 
The construct is useful in interpersonal communication studies and was first explored
2by Hart and Burks (1972) and Hart, Carlson, and Eadie (1980) developed a 
measurement.
Rhetorical sensitivity is described as a continuum between two poles: the Nobel 
Self and the Rhetorical Reflector (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976). Based on Hart and 
Burks (1972) introduction of the sensitivity construct, Darnell and Brockriede went 
further to describe the “polar points” (p. 176). These “points” will be described in full 
detail later, but for now it is enough to state that rhetorical reflectors have basically no 
self to call their own and they are seen to “reflect” the rhetoric of others. Meanwhile, 
noble selves “start with their own selves and project their own perspectives, 
perceptions, and principles onto that other person (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976, 
p. 177).
Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966) is a personality trait that for the most part 
divides populations into two tendencies: internal and external. Someone with an 
internal control tends to attribute self for outcomes in life, where someone with an 
external control attributes situations and outcomes to either chance or luck or some 
other force. Here too, it is not known exactly what leads someone toward one 
tendency. Tendencies have also been known to change or shift throughout one’s life. 
Locus of control is a popular construct to study because of the dichotomous nature and 
its ease of use in correlation studies.
Religiosity is the construct that brings a deeper level of mind-set analysis into 
this communication study. Because of vast differences in how religiosity is used and 
described, it is not feasible to define the construct here. Some of the descriptors will be
3explored in a review of available literature later in this thesis. For now, we will 
describe it as a fundamental belief or lack of belief in Judeo-Christian dogma. It is also 
a cognitive process and produces a dynamic not often examined in traditional 
communication studies. Some religiosity studies translate much like rhetorical 
sensitivity with two poles: fundamentalism and atheism. It is difficult to find 
concentrated populations of college atheists, but quite easy to locate fundamental 
groups. Based on this, it is more practical to divide religiosity into the two groups: 
fundamental and non-fundamental.
This thesis will examine the relationships among the three constructs of 
Rhetorical Sensitivity, Locus of Control, and Religiosity. The purpose of this thesis is 
to learn what relationship (if any) there is between religious belief systems and/or locus 
of control and rhetorical sensitivity.
4Review o f  Literature
Rhetorical Sensitivity. The foundational construct which serves as the communication 
dimension of this study is the idea of rhetorical sensitivity. Although the identification 
of rhetorical sensitivity is a fairly recent accomplishment, the basic construct can trace 
its roots as far back as Aristotle. Rhetorical sensitivity is more than just a continuum of 
conversational flexibility, it actually stems from a “system of attitudes” (Darnell and
i
Brockriede, 1976) that individuals posses. It is about adaptation (or lack of it) in 
dyadic exchanges.
Hart and Burks (1972) offer perhaps the earliest discourse on the sensitivity 
construct. They write: “Because people are different, because our potentials for 
thought and action vary greatly, and because people respond to social forces with 
varying amounts of selectivity and intensity, effective inter-action demands that we 
modify our rhetorical worlds in order to deal better with the worlds of others” (p. 82). 
If how we interact was dependent upon situational factors alone, then exchanges would 
certainly become highly predictable. For instance, if we were able to create perfectly 
similar and controlled circumstances, and if situations alone triggered the human 
response, then regardless of who participated in the experiment the outcome would be 
the same. But we know that the process of communication involves the emergence of 
“self.” The “self’ or “multiple selves” is explained as a “matrix of interrelated forces 
that converge and work jointly to affect the behavior and choices of persons 
communicating” (Darnell and Brockriede, 1976, p. 187). The authors describe the 
behavior not only as a process, but also as a continuum. To completely understand the
5boundaries of the continuum, the authors place two poles on each end with rhetorical 
sensitivity somewhere between them. The poles are noble selves and rhetorical 
reflectors.
Noble Self. Although a pure noble self or rhetorical reflector is a theoretical 
description, the attitude set that belongs to such a person can encompass enough criteria 
for us to fairly describe someone as representing the respective poles. Darnell and 
Brockriede (1976) give four characteristics of noble selves: (a) They have a unitary 
view of self, (b) Self is the primary basis for making communicative choices, (c) 
Noble Self tends to want to control rather than share choices, and (d) Noble Self is a 
static and deterministic certainty that makes choices highly predictable.
A unitary view of self is what brings motivation or justification for behavior 
that may be perceived as perhaps arrogant. The noble self sees himself or herself and 
his or her viewpoints as necessarily correct and will not hesitate to point out differences 
with others. Belonging to the noble self is more than just a concrete set of beliefs and 
values. In his or her unitarianistic approach to verbal exchanges, the noble self also 
transports a certain style of communicating which is also necessarily correct. In other 
words, it is not just what is said but how it is said that makes the noble self unique. The 
noble self communicates in a closed system (Darnell and Brockriede, p. 178). 
According to General Systems Theory (Conrad, 1994), a closed system is one in which 
change is not fluid. When new information is received into the system from another 
system or an outside system, no reaction is made. Change happens only as a deliberate 
process from within the closed system. A closed system in communication can be
6compared to a computer. New data may exist. You can tell the computer to change its 
output. Obviously no change is made until an internal reprogramming occurs.
When a noble self communicates with another party, he or she may alter what 
he or she says or how it is said. The altering is not an attempt to show sensitivity here 
however. It is not fair to describe a Noble Self as someone who does not give a thought 
to how he or she is communicating. It could be said that since no measurable 
sensitivity is calculated, that the Noble Self is one who will speak his or her mind 
regardless of how it is perceived by others. This description is not accurate. A Noble 
Self will alter his or her speech, but only to the degree that it contributes to the noble 
self s own position. The Noble self finds himself or herself communicating with a 
variety of communicators on the sensitivity continuum. Some exchanges may call for a 
greater degree of intensity than others may.
The third characteristic of Noble Selves is the idea that Selves tend to want to 
control conversations rather than share in the natural exchange of ideas. This too can 
be regarded as a characteristic of operation in a closed system. It is not necessarily that 
Selves enjoy listening to the sound of their own voice (though it just might often be the 
case), but that there is a distinct perception that the other person does not have anything 
important to contribute. By controlling or dominating the conversation, Selves attempt 
to transfer their belief system while at the same time ignoring the belief systems of 
others. In one sense, the mind set is machavalistic. Machiavellianism is defined as “a 
high need to control others, regardless of the attending ethical considerations” 
(Widgery, Robin, Tubbs and Stewart, 1972).
7Because of the closed system in which a Noble Self operates, the behavior 
becomes predictable. Unlike a noble self, a highly sensitive person will continually 
draw upon a repertoire of selves and thus become considerably fluid in behavior, 
always striving to enhance the communicative exchange. Prediction of behavior is as 
complex as are the matrix that makes up the communicator. For a noble self, the Self 
has a limited repertoire from which to draw and thus becomes quite predictable in what 
behaviors and what rhetoric are displayed. New information does not affect or alter the 
rhetoric of the Self; thus the behavior is both predictable and static.
Rhetorical Reflectors. Darnell and Brockriede (1976) also give four characteristics of 
Rhetorical Reflectors: (a) They have no self to call their own. (b) They make their 
choices based on the perceived need of the other person, (c) They are acted upon 
rather than act, and (d) They are predictable based on the behavior of the other or upon 
the situation.
The Reflector lives at the opposite end of the continuum from the Noble Self. 
While the Noble Self basically has one self from which to choose from in interpersonal 
exchanges, and the Rhetorically Sensitive has multiple selves from which to choose, the 
Rhetorical Reflector has no self to call their own. Instead, the reflector “borrows” the 
rhetoric of the people with whom he or she interacts. Although the reflector maintains 
a basic set of beliefs and values, these ideals are rarely communicated and typically 
become suppressed as they verbally and behaviorally take on whatever the values and 
rhetoric of those around them are. As communication is exchanged between the 
Reflector and other, the flow of ideas may alter the behavior of both parties, but the
reflector only changes based on where the discussion leads. If a Reflector is conversing 
with a Noble Self, then typically the Reflector will become part of the Selfs system. If 
conversing with someone who is rhetorically sensitive, the Reflector will not initiate 
new information but will mimic and agree with the information provided by the other 
person.
Because Reflectors do not choose to contribute to discourse, they become open 
targets for the adhesion of dialogue from whomever they happen to be conversing. 
They would be considered highly un-argumentative even in situations where they might 
personally disagree with what has been said. In a platoon of new Army recruits, a 
soldier may utterly oppose being awakened at 0400 to go running, but he must reflect 
the rhetoric of the sergeant. His opinion or ideas are not called for as he is in essence, 
acted upon.
Reflectors then, are predictable. For whatever reason a person is classified as a 
reflector, his or her communicative behavior is predictable based upon the behavior of 
the other person(s). This extreme attitude toward allowing others to control the transfer 
of information and remaining communicatively docile leaves the Reflector much like 
film awaiting exposure. One need only to look through the lens of the other person to 
see what outcome will result.
Tenants o f  Rhetorical Sensitivity. Hart et al. (1980) deliver five basic tenants of the 
mind set that makes up a rhetorically sensitive person. The first tenant is Acceptance of 
Personal Complexity. This concept comes from an understanding that there is not a 
one single self (as in the case of Noble Self) that is active in every single dyadic
9exchange. The sensitive person sees him/herself as being made up of many “selves” 
and any one of those “selves” may be drawn upon to give optimum competence in 
various situations. It also means that they do not dwell on specific inconsistencies that 
may arise as a result of endless shifting between selves.
The second tenant is Avoidance of Communicative Rigidity. Here again we see 
parallels to Communication Flexibility. As a key component of the mind set, flexibility 
in communication allows the rhetorically sensitive person to ignore what might be 
perceived as societal expectations. A highly sensitive individual for instance, would 
have no problem playing whatever role the situation called for regardless of how it 
might make him or her look. There are no boundaries or set of rules for proper rhetoric 
for the sensitive person.
The third tenant is Interaction Consciousness. Without this tenant the 
rhetorically sensitive individual has no data to support any of the roles which he or she 
plays. Even though we discuss an attitudinal mind set possessed by an individual, we 
explore only those attitudes that involve interpersonal interactions. One must have a 
rhetorical exchange where decisions can be made and sensitivity manifested. Without a 
read on the other person’s attitude, body language, tonal quality, facial expressions and 
choice of words, a reaction cannot be legitimately inspired. A profound ability to have 
an on-going consciousness of subtle changes in the interaction allows the individual to 
make appropriate adaptations.
The fourth tenant is Appreciation of the Communicability of Ideas. As stated in 
the statement of purpose for this paper, sometimes the values we claim to hold are not
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necessarily manifested in our communicative behavior. It is one thing to be completely 
committed to a particular set of ideas; it is another thing for those ideas to become 
encoded in every dyadic exchange. Being rhetorically sensitive typically involves 
focusing on the needs of the other person involved in the conversation. This does not 
necessarily mean that the other person has a particular need to hear the philosophy of 
the other person. In fact, as Hart et al. (1980) states: “The rhetorically sensitive person 
realizes that some social encounters demand that we say nothing at all...”(p.2).
The fifth tenant is Tolerance for Inventional Searching. A Noble Self or 
Rhetorical Reflector is certainly exempt from this tenant. The rhetorically sensitive 
person is one who will not communicate just to get out information. The interpersonal 
exchange involves a complex process of behavioral transformations. Every person and 
every communication encounter is unique. Because of this, there is no rigid formula 
that dictates how exchanges are to be made. Often times (if not daily) new situations 
and occasions to engage in interpersonal communication arise. Perhaps a situation calls 
for the rhetorically sensitive person to play a role that is absent in his/her repertoire. 
The sensitive person is not only tolerant of the necessity to acquire or invent new 
behaviors, but considers it to be part of the communicative process itself.
Relationship between Rhetorical Sensitivity to other Constructs. Rhetorical Sensitivity 
is not related to communication flexibility (Martin and Rubin, 1994). According to 
these authors, there is a distinct difference in willingness versus ability. 
Communication flexibility is a construct that measures one’s ability to adapt where 
necessary, whereas “Rhetorically Sensitivity people are sensitive to others, believe
11
changing is possible due to the constraints of the situation, and are willing to adapt 
(Martin and Rubin, 1994. p. 173)."
On the other hand, some of the key descriptors of the Communication 
Flexibility construct may be also used to describe Rhetorical Sensitivity. Apart from the 
discussion of ability, Communication Flexibility is based on the notion of adaptation, 
change, and creativity (Spano and Zimmermann, 1995). In this essence, the definition is 
the same: The Rhetorically Sensitive/flexible communicator is one who is able to 
perceive the boundaries of a particular context and devise communication alternatives 
that transcend situational constraints” (Spano and Zimmermann, 1995, p. 19). The 
Rhetorically Sensitive person must also possess an ability to adapt, so why are the 
constructs not significantly related? Part of the answer lies in what Hart, Carlson and 
Eadie refer to when describing the Rhetorical Sensitivity construct: “Rhetorical 
sensitivity is a particular attitude toward encoding spoken messages. It represents a 
way of thinking about what should be said and then, a way of deciding how to say it 
(Hart, Carlson and Eadie, 1980, p.2). Conversational Flexibility does not consider the 
attitudinal mindset that assists the communication process.
Another construct related by definition is Communicative Adaptability. Duran 
(1983) defines this construct as “the ability to perceive socio-interpersonal relationships 
and adapt one’s interaction goals and behaviors accordingly” (p.320). Here again we 
see how the ability to adapt is what gives function to the construct. The rhetorically 
sensitive individual adapts his behavior based on an appreciation of the Other’s point of 
view or reactive behavior. In Communicative Adaptability, adaptation is based on
12
communicative goals of the individual. Many of these constructs appear on the surface 
to be measuring the same thing. Descriptions of the constructs are similar enough to 
cause confusion.
Confusion between these constructs gave credence to a paper written by Steven 
Ward and Dale Bluman. In their discussion entitled “Rhetorical Sensitivity: Missing, 
Mugged, or Morphed?” they posit that perhaps the sensitivity construct has been 
adequately measured by using alternative constructs. They write: “Clearly, research of 
related concepts, especially when producing positive statistical results, will reduce the 
drive to research rhetorical sensitivity5 (Ward, S.A. and Bluman, D.L., 1997, p.5). The 
authors in this paper attempt to explain just why it is that Rhetorical Sensitivity is not 
recognized in main stream communication journals, as are other constructs. They make 
the point that even as recent as 1994 the Handbook of Interpersonal Communication 
does not make mention of the construct directly.
What is inherently different in the Rhetorical Sensitivity construct is that in its 
purest form it measures a set of attitudes toward communication. Portions of the 
construct certainly cross over into similar constructs, but rhetorical sensitivity stands 
alone as a gauge of latent attitudes. Situational constraints do not change these 
attitudes, but rather draw out different behaviors of the same mind-set. This is why 
Ting-Toomey (1988) found differences in rhetorical sensitivity scores when comparing 
three totally distinct cultures. She writes: “The results of this study indicate that there 
are indeed cross-cultural differences in France, Japan, and the United States in their
13
values and attitudes toward rhetorical sensitivity style” (p.35). Culture is known to 
have direct bearing on the development of beliefs and attitudes.
Responses and changes in communicative behavior in a rhetorically sensitive 
person is at best “slippery” (Hart and Burks, 1972, p.91). The rhetorical adaptations are 
based on a mind-set that has been enriched with a life-time of values conditioning. 
What words are spoken and what style in which they are delivered may have significant 
variance where the individual registers on the continuum of sensitivity. Other variables 
certainly contribute in both motivation and manifestation. Personal values may 
contribute toward how willing someone is to adapt their behavior.
Rhetorical Sensitivity and Religiosity. Fulkerson (1986) addressed how Christian 
values are reflected in one who may be rhetorically sensitive. In identifying taxonomy 
of Christian values to compare to rhetorical sensitivity Fulkerson rejected assuming the 
set of values belonging to self-described religious adherents since those values were not 
necessarily religious. Instead he used the Bible itself to serve as the taxonomy. 
Fulkerson points out in his discourse that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical 
sensitivity in order to meet communicative goals. For instance, he quotes the Apostle 
Paul who said:
For though I am free from all men, I have made myself a slave to all, 
that I might win the more. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews; 
to those under the law I became as one under the law—though not being myself 
under the law—that I might win those under the law. To those outside the law I 
became as one outside the law—not being without law toward God but under the
14
law of Christ—that I might win those outside the law. To the weak I became 
weak, that I might win the weak. I have become all things to all men, that I 
might by all means save some. (I Corinthians 9:19-22 Revised Standard 
Version).
There are many parallels to the basic tenants to Rhetorical Sensitivity to 
Christian values expressed in the New Testament. “Let no one seek his own good, but 
the good of his neighbor” (I Corinthians 10:24), and “Let each of you look not only to 
his own interests but to the interests of others” (Philippians 2:3) are examples of 
rhetorical rationales for adaptation. One area of direct contrast however, is the concept 
of “se lf’ and consistency-above-all ethic (Hart and Burks, 1972). The Bible takes the 
position that there is a “real self.” The whole idea that man is to die to self at the 
moment of conversion and become a new creation (II Cor. 5:17) is in stark contrast to 
the first tenant o f rhetorical sensitivity. What then becomes of the Christian convert is 
a new motivation for all interpersonal communication. According to this philosophy, 
the personal values may not necessarily get communicated in every exchange, but the 
values do contribute toward the individual’s willingness to adapt.
The main point of Fulkerson (1986) is that the “essential distinction between 
Hart and Burks’ situation ethic and the rules-based ethic of Christianity is that the 
former is driven by "concern for the complexity of the Other’ but the latter by concern 
for the Other” (p. 11).
Locus o f  Control. The evaluation of individual locus of control is an attempt to 
associate personal behaviors or interactions with personal beliefs. But bringing latent
15
attributions of motivation to the surface is not sufficient to make conclusions or 
generalities regarding behavior, because locus of control is only one level of abstraction 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 1996) above individual orientation. In other words, it would 
be like concluding that the lamp doesn’t work while disregarding the fact that it is not 
plugged in. Thus it becomes necessary to move the discussion of locus of control 
another notch up the abstraction plane and investigate some of the factors that may 
affect self-reported locus of control designations.
Definition o f  Construct. The construct of locus of control is also referred to as 
Internal/External Control. Studies that have included this construct as a variable have 
consistently referenced the work of Julian Rotter (1966). Rotter’s research originated in 
the discipline of psychology and has been used in recent years to understand some 
concepts in other disciplines, including communication. Rotter (1966) gives a 
substantial definition of internal and external control:
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject as following some action of 
his own but not being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our culture, it 
is typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of 
powerful others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of the 
forces surrounding him. When an individual interprets the event in this way, we 
have labeled this as a belief in external control. If the person perceives that the 
event is contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively permanent 
characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal controls, (p.l)
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If one believes that conditions in life are due to one’s own behavior, the 
decisions and thought processes will be different than from one who believes that 
chance or luck are more responsible for the present conditions.
Recent Research Focus. The literature involving the construct of locus of control is 
abundant and crosses many disciplines, but few studies explore the philosophical 
aspects of the construct. By looking at how locus of control has been studied in the 
past and some of the areas where it has been used will serve as a place to start this 
discussion.
It has been shown (Davis and Phares, 1967, p. 557) that individuals whose 
“reinforcement is contingent upon their own behavior tend to actively engage in 
information-seeking to a greater degree than individuals who do not hold such a 
generalized expectancy.” Joe (1971) also found internals to have greater information- 
seeking attributes. In addition, Joe found that internals exhibit more initiative and 
effort in controlling their environment. Another relevant aspect of locus of control was 
studied by Booth-Butterfield (1989). In her study of perceived harassment in the work 
place, she posits that “in work settings internals may be very sensitive to nonverbal 
cues and be aware of potentially coercive situations, but not label the situation 
threatening since they believe they can control it. Conversely, since externals do not 
feel in control to combat harassment, even subtle cues may be viewed as threatening” 
(p.265).
Of interest to this study is a finding reported by Joe (1971) regarding the 
reception of communication from a prestigious versus a non-prestigious source. Joe
17
reports that when identical information is presented from both a high prestige source 
and a low prestige source that externals adjusted their response more than internals. 
Since internals are less conforming (Ritchie and Phares, 1969), they do not rely on 
environmental or social stimuli to dictate their responses. Instead, internals base their 
responses on information.
Booth-Butterfield (1989) states that the internal reliabilities for Rotters I-E scale 
(.65-.79) seem low for some research standards. Rotter (1975) cautions that the I-E 
scale is not appropriate for all situations. He states: “the I-E scale is subject, as are all 
personality measures, to the conditions of testing and the known or suspected purposes 
or nature of the examinee” (p.62). Rotter also states that even though it would be ideal 
to have a separate measurement for every facet of research, it would be an expensive 
undertaking (Rotter, 1975). Rotter’s I-E scale does seem to satisfy many researchers 
however. Hill and Bale (1981) discuss the use of the “unfocused generalized nature” 
(p.287) of the Rotter’s scale and state that some researchers find the scale appropriate, 
even if it leads to insignificant results.
Causation Theory. There is an entire body of literature that falls under the umbrella of 
cognitive social learning theory. Germane to this theory is the concept of causation. 
Understanding the principles of causation will help interpret the other theories 
discussed here. The theory of causation states that the orientation (internal/external) 
begins in childhood. For instance, externality can be seen in the thinking of children 
when they attempt to explain causes in the outer world (Reid and Ziegler, 1981). “An 
example of animistic thinking would be the belief that a ball rolled down the hill
18
because it wanted to do so” (p. 131). As a child matures and learns what behaviors and 
actions he or she is actually in control of, it becomes natural to attribute events not 
controlled as being external.
Even though psychology is the discipline that first experienced research with 
the locus of control variable, by no means did the concept stay there. Applications of 
this construct have reached beyond psychology and have shown up in disciplines such 
as communication, health, sports, religion, sociology, education, and others. It is not 
unusual that conclusions made within these disciplines are taken at face value. For 
instance, “externals are found to be more likely to...” or “Hypothesis one was supported 
which states that internals tend to...” Just by tabulating the results of a typical I-E scale, 
it can become tempting to make these predictions. Although internal reliability of the 
I-E scales are consistently greater than .7, the validity of the scales may be significantly 
distorted just by something as simple as semantics. For instance, interchanging the 
words “lucky” and “fortunate” on a questionnaire may lead to different responses.
By understanding the construct within the context of a higher abstraction level, 
there is the possibility that the validity of these studies might increase. Williams (1992) 
defines validity as “the degree to which researchers measure what they claim to 
measure” (p.29). The evidence that externally oriented individuals behave or react 
differently according to certain criteria may satisfy some researchers, but it is entirely 
possible that understanding why some subjects respond as they do may more accurately 
measure the original question.
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Deterministic Heritage. Determinism is the belief that all human behavior or actions 
result from uncontrollable forces. In direct opposition to this philosophy is the concept 
of free will. Babbie (1998) suggests that the fundamental question is this: “Is your 
behavior the product of your personal will power, or the product of forces and factors 
that you cannot control and may not even recognize?” (p.69) It is a question not easily 
answered as philosophers have debated this concept along with “Does God exist?”
When considering the concept of determinism for this study, references are held 
in regard to cognitive orientations and not physical, technical, or some other scientific 
orientation. There are studies to examine whether traits such as birth order (Eisenman 
and Platt, 1968) or conditions of mental illness (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969) directly 
affect locus of control. For instance Eisenman and Platt (1968) discovered that first­
born males tend to have a greater external orientation.
The determinism paradigm is the supporting thread for B.F. Skinner’s work on 
the concept of behaviorism. According to Skinner (1971), external forces control our 
behavior. Behaviorists emphasize that human action and behavior are directly and only 
related to external forces.
Lefcourt (1976) directly challenges Skinner. Lefcourt suggests that belief in 
free will is not irrelevant. He writes: “Whether people, or other species for that matter, 
believe that they are actors and can determine their own fates within limits will be seen 
to be of critical importance to the way in which they cope with stress and engage in 
challenge” (Lefcourt, 1976, p.2). Specifically, studies in areas such as health 
(Wallston, B.S., Wallston, K.A., Kaplan and Maides, 1976) show that control
20
orientation may lead to various health related behaviors. Another direct challenge 
toward Skinner’s philosophy is the suggestion that what Skinner thought would lead to 
an orderly and mannerly world paradoxically can be viewed as a source of increased 
violence (Lefcourt, 1976).
Also refuting the concept of Skinner’s behaviorism is Glasser (1984). When 
Skinner suggests that free will is an illusion, he attempts to remove any sense of the 
individual nature in man. Glasser (1984) demonstrates the concept of free will by 
comparing human motivation to an electronic device:
A telephone-answering device is a dead machine. It has no choice but to 
answer the phone. Its actions are controlled by the outside ring, and its sole 
purpose, put into it by its all powerful designer, is to respond without question 
to that ring. It is as truly a slave as only a robot can be. But if we believe that, 
like machines, we are controlled by outside forces, whether as simple as a red 
light or as complex as a tyrannical husband, and give up the idea that we always 
have choices, we embrace slavery, (p.2).
Rubin and McNeil (1992) suggest that humanists, as opposed to behaviorists, 
hold the belief that our ability to make judgments or choices is due to internal control. 
Schlossberg (1983) makes the point that “[i]f man is all matter and his actions 
completely determined by events over which he has no control, we may ask wherein 
lies his uniqueness” (p. 149). Locus of control cannot then be simply regarded as a 
personality trait, but carries with some deeper philosophical ideology. To make the 
connection would seem to be important in a study of the meaning of self motivation.
2 1
The concept of determinism versus free will may be the ancestral root for the 
newer concept of locus of control. Determinism can be traced at least as far back as 
Babylonian astrology (Schlossberg, 1983). According to the enlightened thinking of 
the time, the belief in determinism was a welcome substitute for displacing the 
“Christian anthropology.” As Schlossberg writes: “For if  evil were not to be explained 
by something inherent in man, then it was natural to look to circumstances for the 
explanation” (p. 148).
In anticipation of a possible tautology between the concepts o f determinism/free 
will and internal/external locus of control, Waldman, Viney, Bell, Bennett, and Hess 
(1983) examined the two constructs to see if they were correlated. There were two 
basic assumptions or questions that led them into their research: (a) “Those who believe 
in an internal locus of control may also believe in free will”, and (b) “Those who 
believe in an external locus o f control may be more likely to embrace a deterministic 
philosophy” (p. 631). By using the two scales: free-will determinism scale: (Viney, 
Walman and Barchilon, 1982) and I-E scale (James, 1973)1 they were able to show a 
low-order relationship between these beliefs. The results showed that “belief in an 
external locus of control and belief in determinism are not necessarily the same thing. 
Similarly, belief in free will and in an internal locus of control are not necessarily the 
same thing” (Waldman et al., 1983, p.633). The authors suggest that this finding could 
mean that a determinist could respond on a survey so as to reflect an internal locus of
1 James’ scale was used rather than the more common Rotter I-E scale because of James’ use of Likert- 
style questioning as opposed to Rotter’s forced choice, since the objective was a correlation.
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control. The authors further state that the data used for their study strongly suggest that 
the performance on the I-E scale has little to do with the belief in free will and 
determinism (Waldman et al.,1983).
Babbie (1998) describes points of focus in reference to research design. Two of 
the points of reference are characteristics and orientations. Characteristics are described 
as units of analysis that refer to items such as “Gender, age, height, marital status, 
deformities, region of origin, or hearing ability” (pp. 99-100). Orientations are 
attitudes, beliefs, and other general tendencies. It should be feasible at this point to 
include locus of control as a characteristic of unit of analysis. Whereas “free will and 
determinism assess an attitudinal orientation” (Waldman et al., 1983, p. 634).
Another study (Stroessner and Green, 1990) examined dimensions of belief in 
determinism. The authors suggest that behavioral psychologists and fundamental 
Christians might achieve similar scores for belief in determinism, but the basis for that 
belief may be highly contrasted. For instance, a Christian may believe in a God who 
determines his or her behaviors, whereas a psychologist (who does not necessarily have 
a religious orientation) may believe in external control due to some other force. It 
becomes an important distinction when trying to predict certain behaviors because 
conditions, which appear to be caused by associated variables, may actually have other 
factors at work. The authors thus broke down determinism into two basic dimensions: 
Religious-philosophical and Psychosocial. One of the hypotheses of the Stroessner and 
Green study predicted that Religious-philosophical determinists would be more 
external than libertarians (humanists...or free will agents) would. The reason cited for
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Religious-philosophical constituents to have a more external orientation was the idea 
that determinism is based on the belief in an actual plan or purpose (Stroessner and 
Green, 1990). The findings in Stroessner and Green’s study did not fully support this 
hypothesis. It was shown that religious-philosophical determinists actually have a 
higher internal locus of control.
The authors explain the discrepancy by stating “Apparently, they [religious- 
philosophical determinists] perceived such a plan to be quite personal, not impersonal. 
The personal nature of their conception of these external forces may have been 
responsible for the finding that religious-philosophical determinists had a more internal 
locus of control than psychosocial determinists” (Stroessner and Green, 1990, p.798). 
It would seem appropriate to investigate the dimension of religiosity a bit further.
Although some social scientists and philosophers prefer to discuss the aspects of 
determinism and free will in absence of religion, it is clear that an argument can be 
made for a careful look at the effects of religion on the cognitive dimensions of this 
subject. Reid and Ziegler (1981) suggest that belief in religion may be a natural 
function of social learning. As children develop and begin to differentiate between 
internal control and external control, there are many events or actions that are not easily 
explained. Believing in some sort of religion or supernatural entity brings cognitive 
relief for the unexplained (Reid and Ziegler, 1981). Even if  parents teach their children 
to believe in a god-type being, a child may grow to challenge that belief or accept it.
Religiosity and Locus o f  Control. It has been suggested that belief in religion 
(Stroessner and Green, 1990) should lead towards an external locus of control
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orientation. The authors speculate that since their hypothesis was not supported it may 
have been due to the belief by religious-philosophical determinists that the Almighty’s 
plan for them was more personal. The propensity towards internal or external 
orientation among religious populations cannot be determined easily through idealistic 
means. According to accepted biblical framework, there is support for belief in the 
deterministic function of the Almighty, such as: “Your kingdom come. Your will be 
done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread” (Matthew 6: 10-11, 
New King James Version). But there is equal support throughout scripture for a free 
will conception, such as: “For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) nothing good 
dwells; for to will is present with me, but not to perform what is good I do not find” 
(Romans 7:18, new King James Version).
Although either orientation can be justified, it appears that to highly religious 
people, the thought of chance, or luck, may be uncomfortable. Lefcourt (1976) suggests 
that among sub populations where highly idealistic or distinctive belief systems exist, 
the traditional I-E scales may not maintain their integrity. A study done by Gabbard, 
Howard, and Tageson (1986) recognized the idealistic extreme of what they describe as 
Christian Fundamentalists. They developed a measure of locus of control that revises 
all references to luck and chance and replaces them with references to God or spiritual 
entities. For instance, the Rotter statement “In my case getting what I want has little or 
nothing to do with luck” becomes “In my case getting what I want has little or nothing 
to do with spiritual guidance” (Gabbard et al., 1986, p.296). To determine reliability of 
this measure, the researchers used the revised measure along with the original Rotter I-
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E scale. The result of their initial study showed that among highly religious or 
fundamental populations, the revised religious scale showed a significantly higher 
external orientation.
Understanding the locus of control in religious contexts is more than a matter of 
semantics. Removing references to luck or chance on self-report questionnaires may 
give more accurate results among certain populations, but in the Gabbard et al. (1986) 
study mentioned above, a specific church body was used as subjects. The limitations 
thus possibly become tied to specific indoctrination. In order to gain the most benefit 
from obtaining accurate I-E orientations among religious groups, a standard, or a 
measure of religiosity needs to be employed. King and Hunt (1972) developed one 
such measure. These authors present an exhaustive scale of religious behaviors and 
beliefs such as Creedal Assent, Devotionalism, Congregational Attendance, Religious 
Knowledge, Orientation to Religion, and Salience.
An appropriate caution regarding research among highly religious populations 
comes from Rasmussen and Charman (1995). Suggested as a limitation in studies of 
this nature, the authors suggest that the dogmatism inherent in some religions may 
make personality and belief systems one o f the same. “An individual’s personal 
interpretations, meaning, and attitudes toward their religion will necessarily affect their 
responses to the methods of investigation employed...” (Rasmussen and Charman, 
1995, p.l 16). This premise thus fosters further support for determining how extreme in 
religion the subjects are.
26
In addition to understanding the “deeper” meanings of locus of control, it 
should also be pointed out that there is a sufficient body or research that demonstrates 
how perceptions can change when situations change. This “situational-based” criterion 
may lead to similar biases contemplated beyond what is typically noted in a survey. 
Loewenthal and Cornwall (1993) state: “general measures may mask effects that are 
specific to situations” (p.40). If the study of hypothetical events and the attribution 
tendencies that result were germane to a study, then it would certainly be reasonable to 
take situational variables into account. There may be several factors at play in any 
given situation that may cause behaviors to occur which override any aspect of 
orientation. However, to study a sample’s ordinary disposition, free from situation, 
would give results that would be easier to compare. How someone responds to 
hypothetical situations may also differ than how someone might respond in realistic 
situations.
Some researchers account for situation by modifying the measurement to relate 
to a particular situation. For instance, Sandoz (1996) used a modified I-E scale called 
the MHLC (Multidimensional Health Locus of Control) to assess the degree to which 
alcoholics within the Alcoholics Anonymous system attribute control over personal 
health. Because of the spiritual aspects of alcoholics recovery and the degree to which 
motivation comes through direct teaching of the “powerful others” concept (an external 
orientation), it becomes natural to evaluate attributions in this light. Both situation and 
sample have prompted researchers to adapt their measurements to apply to specific
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studies. Early and especially contemporary studies have been highly critical of 
undisceming uses of the locus of control construct.
Hamilton (1991) has effectively fine tuned the direction of locus o f control to 
specifically fit within communication research. Hamilton is somewhat critical of 
studies that have treated locus of control exclusively as a personality trait, and 
furthermore, have treated it primarily as an independent variable. “One measured LOC 
and then looked at the differences between internals and externals on a variety o f other 
dimensions such as knowledge or political activity. This implies that internals and 
externals would always be so and, therefore, were doomed to respond to their 
orientation” (Hamilton, 1991, p. 107). The author suggests that locus of control has 
several characteristics that are overlooked, one being its convertibility.
Religiosity. Religiosity, as a construct, is open to as many interpretations as one is 
willing to generate. But what makes religiosity of such keen interest to this study is the 
versatility it presents when used as a correlate against most other constructs. A 
researcher may customize the variables and so define religiosity so that it can be 
applied to any number of “problems.” One of the approaches to studying this construct 
is reflective of Rotter’s locus of control. Allport and Ross (1967), break down 
religiosity into internal versus external (extrinsic/intrinsic).
Problems inherent in Defining Religiosity. In the definition process, the construct of 
religiosity can be extended to measure specific aspects of religiosity. For instance, 
religiosity can be a measure of one’s moral values, belief in God, church attendance, 
denominationalism, knowledge of the Bible, affinity toward life (or death), prejudice,
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conservatism, dogmatism, orthodoxy, and so on. These and many more variables can 
be pieced together in researcher’s definition of religiosity.
There are many studies (DeJong, Faulkner, and Warland, 1976; DeHaan and 
Schulenberg, 1997; King and Hunt, 1975) that deal specifically with the multi­
dimensional aspects of arriving at an operational definition. Many instruments have 
developed reliability and become useful for studying different ways of being religious. 
There are many studies such as Chamberlain and Zika, (1988) that only utilize a single 
or perhaps two-dimension characterization. For instance Reiss (1965) measured 
religiosity by simply measuring church attendance. The church attendance score was 
then compared with the construct of sexual permissiveness. Socha (1978) states that 
simply “measuring church attendance does not tap into all the complexity of 
religiousness” (p.2). These studies tend to be vague and hardly generalizable, but they 
do demonstrate a single dimension within a study.
To be sure, religiosity is a highly personalized mind-set. The simple question 
“do you believe in heaven?” could have the same affirmative answer among several in 
a population, but how each person arrived at the answer could be vastly different. A 
child who is asked by a Sunday School teacher to think about heaven may conjure up in 
his mind a day at the beach where he heard his father say “Ahhhhh, this is heaven.” 
Semantics could also play havoc when conducting religiosity research. The word 
Christian is used quite loosely in Western cultures. It means something entirely 
different in say, the Middle East. In addition, when studied cross culturally, certain 
dimensions have different results. For instance, DeJong, Faulkner, and Warland (1976)
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found that in comparing German students to American students they discovered that 
“German students attend church less frequently, are less likely to endorse traditional 
Judeo-Christian beliefs about God and death...” (p,871) and so orn Denominational 
differences within domestic borders are also prone to show differences in the meaning 
of some terms. Researchers must also account for highly religious people who don’t 
attend church or low religious people who do. Brown and Lowe (1951) attempted to 
carefully define their construct knowing about this complexity. They state: “It is 
obvious that the definition of religious belief employed here does not take into account 
the religiosity which might be present among people who do not adhere to traditional 
Christian dogma. A person may not believe certain religious doctrines but still be 
religious by other definitions” (p. 104). The above concerns are addressed when content 
validity is established. Each content area that is to be included in an operational 
definition must be analyzed in detail (Martin, 2000).
Operationalization o f  Religiosity. The operational definition used for any study 
utilizing the religiosity construct is crucial. Without validity the results obtained from 
research cannot be generalizable to any sample outside of the one being studied. 
Chamberlain and Zika (1988), mentioned that results can vary according to “how 
religion was measured” (p.411).
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of locus of control, social learning can 
have a major impact on the development of religiosity in an individual. Learned 
religious behaviors may become internalized at some point in life, or linger exclusively 
as an external phenomenon. Many studies (Scarlett and Perriello, 1990, Francis and
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Pearson, 1987, Kotesky, Walker and Johnson, 1990) have focused on the changes that 
take shape as a child proceeds through adolescence. DeHann and Schulenberg (1997) 
describe a study that suggests that “adolescents become less reliant on rituals or visible 
observations of religious activity, and become more concerned with internal processes” 
(p.539). Based on considerable empirical evidence that children undergo significant 
changes in their religious belief system, it seems fair to conclude that religious attitudes 
do result from cognitive activities and are not necessarily latent. Other studies, such as 
Emsberger and Manaster (1981) reiterate that higher moral reasoning in adolescents is 
the result of exposure to the teaching-learning process.
Intrinsic religious beliefs can appear to be related to relational competence and 
communication skills. Ragsdale (1994) states: “One might logically expect a 
committed Christian to exhibit relational communication skill. For example, self­
disclosure is necessary for fellowship. Empathy, interaction involvement, and listening 
could be anticipated because they reflect concern for one’s neighbor” (p.268).
In the study of religiosity many researchers have developed a certain typology 
which has led toward the operationalization of the construct. To conclude this review 
of literature on religiosity, a look into several of the typologies should bring to light the 
appropriate approach this study will take in this present research.
One-Fold Typology. Brown and Lowe (1951) completed a project that demonstrates a 
one-fold typology. In this genre, a group of questions are formulated, possibly in 
Likert-style format. In Brown and Lowe’s study the inventory consists of fifteen 
statements (in Likert-style). Once completed, a score is produced and it becomes
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apparent what degree of religiosity the subjects hold. This index score then becomes 
available for regressions with other variables.
Some researchers will actually use a one-fold typology as though it was two­
fold. Even though the goal of the research is placement on a continuum of religiosity, 
in essence the sample becomes divided into two basic types or extremes. These types 
are not always defined, but the poles are apparent and well within view. There will 
always be a median score based on the index, thus half of the sample will lead toward 
the upper half or respectively the lower half. Whether or not the poles are given a tag is 
completely up to the researcher and the purpose of the study. If the poles are identified, 
perhaps two-fold typology is more appropriate. If not, then generally what is sought is 
a degree of religiosity rather than a type. At the very least the verbiage within the 
discussion will refer to the sample as “highly religious” or “low religious.”
Two-Fold Typology. The most common way to determine religiosity is apparently a 
two-fold approach. When defined, the sample becomes divided into one of two groups. 
The operational definition is set up according to what information is being sought.
By using two types, a continuum between two poles is generated. Whether it is 
internal versus external, mature versus immature, fundamental versus non-fundamental, 
believer versus non-believer, intrinsic versus extrinsic, high versus low, or some other 
dichotomy, the results become ready for correlation or cross tabulation.
As mentioned earlier, Allport and Ross (1967) have one of the better known and 
often cited instruments, which is clearly a two-fold approach. The authors divide the 
sample into intrinsic and extrinsic. Extrinsic religion is described as an orientation
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toward using religion as a means to an end. It is merely a show where piety dwells. 
Intrinsic religion, on the other hand, is described as the primary motivational force in 
one’s life. “Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and 
follow it fully. It is in this sense that he lives his religion” (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 
434).
Three-Fold Typology. Another often quoted research team, Snell Putney and Russell 
Middleton, put together a four dimension, three-fold study. The two types or poles, 
based on scores from the four dimensional scales, are skeptics, modernists, and 
conservative. The overall construct employed in their study (1961) is Religious 
Attitude or Ideology. In order to avoid some of the problems faced with other studies 
(such as being too narrow or broad in scope); the four dimensions measured completely 
different aspects of being religious, and were then compared. The dimensions were 
orthodoxy, fanaticism, importance, and ambivalence. The unique characteristic of this 
approach is that extreme beliefs (such as atheism) will be identified. Putney and 
Middleton write: “Thus an atheist whose convictions were important to his self- 
conception might receive a spuriously high score if the scale were regarded as a 
measure of orthodoxy, and a spuriously low score if  the scale were regarded as a 
measure of the subjective importance of his belief’ (1961, p.286).
Another approach to a three-fold topology is a study conducted by Batson and 
Ventis (1982). Batson and Ventis utilize the Allport and Ross (1967) scale of Religious 
Orientation. However, they posit serious doubts about whether this scale actually 
measures what it is supposed to measure. In an attempt to remedy what they feel is
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lacking, they introduce a third way of being religious: quest. “An individual who 
approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably 
never will know, the final truth about such matters” (Batson and Ventis (1982, p. 150). 
Because quest religion is an understanding that the pursuit of religion is not an end or a 
latent orientation, those who score high on this scale are ones that are prone to change 
in their beliefs.
Four-Fold Typology. A study that can be classified as four-fold is by Allport and Ross 
(1967). In this study they reformulate their original two fold topology (intrinsic versus 
extrinsic) based on research conducted by Peabody (1961). In Peabody’s paradigm he 
administered tests to subjects at different times. The questions were worded positive 
during the first test and negative during the second. He discovered that some subjects 
were consistent in their responses, but others had agreed to both wordings. Allport and 
Ross applied that paradigm to their intrinsic/extrinsic model and produced the four-fold 
topology. The first type is Intrinsic. These are people who scored high on the intrinsic 
scale and also low on the extrinsic scale. The second type is extrinsic; those who score 
high on the extrinsic scale but low on the intrinsic scale. The third type is 
indiscriminately pro religious: those who score high on both scales. And finally, the 
indiscriminately anti-religious or non-religious (those who score low on both scales) 
were included. Richards (1991) uses this same four-fold typology in a study but 
changes the term indiscriminately anti-religious to nontraditionally religious. He states: 
“the finding that most students classified as “anti-religious actually professed to believe 
in a Supreme Being suggests that the terms anti-religious and non-religious,
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traditionally used to refer to persons in this religious orientation group, would be 
misnomers in this study” (p. 191)
Five-Fold Typology. Citing the complexity of the religiosity construct, Faulkner and 
DeJong (1966) developed a five-dimension methodology that accounts for many of the 
gaps in other instruments. The development of their “5-D” instrument was based on 
the work of Glock (1962) who proposed that studies that limit the operationalization to 
two or three dimensions would in essence exclude other dimensions. “[AJttendence at 
church may be utilized as the identifying factor of the religious devotee. Or, 
affirmations of belief in God plus a measure of attendance at church may be combined 
to provide an index of religiosity.” (Faulkner and DeJong, 1966, p.2). The five 
dimensional approach takes into account experiential, ritualistic, ideological, 
intellectual, and consequential aspects of being religious. Taking the traditional 
“Judeo-Christian” answer to questions in each of the above categories, Faulkner and 
DeJong measure respondent’s deviations from the traditional response.
The difficulty with this measurement is that recent surges in diversity bring a 
complexity not realized by Faulkner and DeJong in 1966. The Judeo-Christian mindset 
is not necessarily main stream in many communities, thus measuring deviations from 
this mind-set may no longer measure what they wanted to measure. However, if  this 
present study is interested in learning what relationship there is between locus of 
control, rhetorical sensitivity, and religiosity in a fundamental orientation, than this 
measurement may be the best fit for such a study.
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Although this present study is certainly not a study of the religiosity of college 
students, the question of religiosity cannot simply be a nominal question. By doing so 
there would be not be enough information to make a construct relationship study valid. 
What is desired is to be able to distinguish between extremes. Are there attributes that 
become predictable among highly fundamental religious students? What about 
students who score low? Perhaps religiosity is not significant in predicting rhetorical 
sensitivity or locus of control.
In an attempt at operationalizing religiosity for the purpose of this study the 
research of Brown and Lowe (1951) is again cited. The researches developed a simple 
Likert style measurement that contains fifteen items. Of particular interest is that this 
survey was tested among college students and found to be reliable. The result of the 
fifteen item survey will be an index score on a continuum between rejection and 
acceptance of Christian Dogma.
What makes the study of religiosity unique in America is the very diversity that 
exists. In a “free culture” where individual make up of locus of control, rhetorical 
sensitivity, and religiosity are unaffected by societal restraints, it is possible to view a 
“snap shot” of one’s belief system. In contrast to cultures (such as Islamic) where 
religiosity is a shared trait, studies done in the United States explore the variance that 
exists.
2 Spearman-Brown formula of .87 (p. 107)
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Statement o f  Purpose 
The potential to predict or alter behavior is one of the greatest benefits of 
conducting social research. Learning how populations interact and communicate in the 
world around them may teach us ways to improve those interactions. Often times 
research goes beyond simple observations of interaction and questions the motivations 
or orientations of the participants. How or what an individual believes can certainly 
affect their interactions and/or behaviors.
Sometimes the values we claim to hold are not necessarily manifested in our 
communicative behavior. It is one thing to be completely committed to a particular set 
of ideas; it is another thing for those ideas to become encoded in every dyadic 
exchange. Obviously not every interpersonal exchange reaches a level where 
philosophy can flow, but even the ones that do are affected by an unlimited number of 
variables with the potential of altering the outcome. Psychological orientations, 
attitude sets, personalities, and situational factors contribute towards each interchange. 
The values we hold dear are often times clouded by these potential filters.
Research has shown us that when a particular group of people hold similar 
beliefs or attitudes, certain behaviors or orientations become predictable. We can 
measure interpersonal communication first hand, but what we learn is limited. We can 
evaluate semantics, nonverbal communication, body language, para-verbal 
communication, voice tone, and a number of other variables. None of these come close 
to helping us predict what values are latent in the communicator. However, when we
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measure two or more particular orientations, it becomes more feasible to predict how a 
subject would respond in a given situation.
If we were able to take a snap shot of our belief system at any given point in 
time; we could see clearly the parameters or range of our beliefs. What we don’t see is 
how we got to where we are. Our make up is so complex that it would be impossible to 
ever have a complete inventory of the elements that have shaped us. Apart from the 
benefit of genetics, our personal worlds begin taking shape in the womb and continue 
throughout our lifetime. We may attend church...but why? Is it because our parents 
took us to church every Sunday and it became a habit, or did we develop a sort of 
insecurity at an early age that only going to church can pacify? Is our view of God 
based on personal study or peer influence? Perhaps a bad experience at some point 
altered our perceptions more so than any other influence ever could.
How we define a church denomination can also make a difference when we 
attempt to describe why some people are catholic and some are not. If we look at a 
denomination in the traditional sense (that is, we go to a particular church because our 
parents went), then affiliation though heritage can be justified. It may come to mean 
nothing more than a ritual. People who attend church merely because they have been 
“programmed” to, can almost be referred to as being religious by default.
If we look at church going as a commitment to a set of ideas or attitudes, then 
affiliation through cognition makes more sense. In this sense, church affiliation is 
merely a by-product of a higher level of need satisfaction.
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Each person possesses a religious or idealistic belief system. The development 
of the many factors, which constitute an individual’s make up, is a simultaneous 
process. By using the tool o f self-disclosure, we can look at what the tendency of belief 
is a certain point in time.
At the same moment in time we can look at various attitude sets that have 
developed from the exact same life experiences. What makes a person say exactly 
what they are thinking only to offend someone else? Or what makes another person 
hold their tongue when they know they disagree? Could it be because of a belief 
system in place?
Situational factors can certainly contribute toward communicative behavior, but 
what is of interest to this study is how belief systems contribute to rhetorical 
communication.
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis is to learn if  there is a 
relationship between traditional religious belief systems and/or locus of control to 
rhetorical sensitivity. This study is exploratory in nature. If a significant relationship is 
discovered, it may open the door to future research involving these variables. Based on 
the literature discussed here, the following research questions are proposed:
Ri Is religiosity related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and/or rhetorical
reflectomess?
R.2 Is locus o f control related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess and/or
rhetorical reflectomess?
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R.3 Do fundamentally religious college students differ from non or less religious
college students in their levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical 
reflectomess and locus of control?
R4 Can levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess
be predicted by both religiosity and locus of control?
Rs Is there a difference in religiosity, locus of control, rhetorical sensitivity, noble
selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio-demographic factors of school 
attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church attendance, and religious 
denomination?
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Chapter 2 
Methodology
Rhetorical Sensitivity was measured using the 40 item RHETSEN scale (see 
Appendix A) introduced by Hart, Carlson and Eadie (1980). The instrument contained 
three sub-scales. The first sub-scale measures rhetorical sensitivity or RS. In the 
operationalization of the construct it was discovered that the two other encoding 
attitudinal sets could also be measured from the same data by simply changing the 
code. Darnell and Brockreide's (1976) concepts of Noble self or NS, and its polar 
opposite, Rhetorical Reflector or RR, can be scored “similar to the method used in 
scoring rhetorical sensitivity.” (Carlson, 1997 p. 10).
The measurement of locus of control took into account the special populations 
that were part of the research. Gabbard, Howard, and Tageson (1986) have done 
specific testing of locus of control among religious populations. Because there is 
special concern among highly idealistic or fundamental groups mentally rejecting 
references to “luck” or “fate,” some modifications of Rotter’s (1966) IE scale were 
made and tested. Gabbard et al. (1986) came up with two revisions, both of which 
maintained the integrity of Rotter’s forced choice questionnaire. A Likert-style I.E. 
instrument does exist (James, 1957) but too few studies have been done to show 
validity. The first modification to Rotter’s measurement was to make references to 
luck and chance neutral. The other modification made the same references to reflect 
spiritual entities. Both modifications, according to Gabbard et al. maintain “slightly 
higher validity coefficients” (p. 306). In order to obtain a reliable sample for this study,
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college students from both religious (fundamental) and secular institutions were 
surveyed. The authors of this modification suggest that if you know a population to be 
more fundamental, then the religious-revision can be used. However “[a]n even 
stronger case can be made for utilizing the neutral-revision in both general and 
fundamentalist populations” (p. 306). The goal of this research was to utilize a single 
measurement for all populations. With that goal in mind, and based on claims made by 
the authors, the neutral-revision of Rotter’s IE scale was used (see Appendix B). The 
forced choice answers resulted in a single score for each participant. The scores from 
the survey range from 0 to 23 with higher scores indicating a tendency toward an 
external locus of control and lower scores representing an internal locus of control.
Religiosity was studied by using a measurement developed by Brown and Lowe 
(1951) called “The Inventory of Religious Belief’ (see Appendix C). The survey was 
developed specifically for use among college students and has been shown to be a 
reliable indicator of acceptance or rejection of Christian dogma. Even in diverse 
populations, groups that typically do not adhere to traditional Judeo-Christian thought 
will most likely score low. The format of the instrument is Likert-type (five degree). 
The instrument has fifteen statements of Judeo-Christian thought. The scores can range 
from 15 (the least fundamental or religious) to 75 (the most fundamental or religious).
A brief demographic survey was included with the three instruments, (see 
Appendix D). The demographic questions included information about class and major 
as well as questions about church attendance and denominational influence. Students 
enrolled at two private colleges and one state university were utilized. Questionnaires
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were prepared and all three instruments and demographic questionnaires were given at 
the beginning of class periods in Introductory Speech Communications classes or 
similar courses. Each student received a test packet in which answers were recorded. 
Brief instructions and explanation were given as the tests were handed out to minimize 
time allotted for examination. A preliminary test showed that it would take 
approximately 20 to 30 minutes to complete the entire questionnaire.
The three institutions utilized for this study were all in Minnesota. Each school 
accepted the researcher’s Nebraska Institutional Review Board status (see Appendix E 
for a copy of the approval form). A total of 238 students turned in surveys, 48 from 
Pillsbury Baptist Bible College, 82 from Crown College, and 108 from Southwest 
State.
Research Question 1 asked if religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble 
selfhess, and/or rhetorical reflectomess. This particular relationship has been studied 
in a generalized manner (Hart, Carlson & Eadie, 1980), but no studies have been found 
where the Brown & Lowe (1951) or similar scale was used. Pearson correlations were 
mn between the three RHETSEN subscales and the Inventory of Religious Belief scale.
Research Question 2 asked if locus of control is related to rhetorical sensitivity, 
noble selfhess, and/or rhetorical reflectomess. This relationship has also been studied 
(Hart, Carlson, Eadie, 1980) but not using the Gabbard, Howard & Tageson (1986) 
neutral-revision of the locus of control inventory. Pearson correlations were run 
between the three RHETSEN subscales and the Locus of Control Inventory.
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Research Question 3 asked: Do fundamentally religious college students differ 
from non or less religious college students in their level of rhetorical sensitivity, noble 
selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess? Subjects were divided into four groups based on 
inventory of religious belief score (over one standard deviation (SD) above the mean, 
the mean to one SD above the mean, the mean to minus one SD below the mean, and 
below the mean minus one SD). A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
explore this relationship with religiosity being the independent variable and the three 
RHETSEN sub-scales (noble self, rhetorical sensitivity, and rhetorical reflector) the 
dependent variables.
Research Question 4 asks if levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and 
rhetorical reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus of control. A stepwise 
regression was mn with the independent variables of religiosity and locus of control 
and each of the three separate dependent variables (rhetorical sensitivity, noble 
selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess).
Research Question 5 asks if there is a difference in religiosity, locus of control, 
rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfhess, and rhetorical reflectomess based on socio­
demographic factors of school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church 
attendance, and religious denomination. One-way analyses of variance and an 
independent t-test were used to explain these relationships. The dependent variables 
were the five scales: Rhetorical Sensitivity, Rhetorical Reflectomess, Noble Self, 
Religiosity and Locus of Control. For the analyses of variance, the independent 
variables were the three sampled institutions (Southwest, Crown, Pillsbury); the four
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standard years in school (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and non-traditional 
students; major (communication, psychology, other social science, and non-social 
science); church attendance (everyweek, almost everyweek, occasionally, seldom, and 
never), and denominational affiliation (regrouped into six general groups plus a seventh 
group of “Others”). For the independent t-test, the independent variable was gender.
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Chapter 4 
Results
The three institutions that were sampled were Southwest State University (45% 
of the sample), Crown College (34% of the sample) and Pillsbury Baptist Bible College 
(20% of the sample). All three o f these institutions are in the southern half of 
Minnesota and draw students from both urban and rural environments. The majority of 
students are from Minnesota. The students who participated in the research were asked 
basic socio-demographic questions (see Appendix D). Table 1 presents the raw data in 
terms of response frequency and percentage.
Students were asked to indicate which denomination affiliation comes closest to 
how they would describe themselves. The largest group represented was “Baptist” at 
27%. The next largest was Lutheran (18%) followed by Catholic (14%).
Other demographics included class, major, gender, and frequency of church 
attendance. Freshmen were the highest participating group (45%) with each subsequent 
class number less. Non-Traditional students made up less than 1% of the total.
Social Science majors other than Communication or Psychology had the highest 
frequency of participants (42%). Students who were not in social science fields were 
the next highest group (38%). Communication students were the smallest group (9%). 
There were slightly more females who participated (55%) than males (45%).
The frequency of church attendance revealed that 47% of the participants 
attended church every week. The second highest frequency were those who attended 
almost every week. (21%). Those who attend church occasionally were the next
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highest (15%), followed by those who attend several times per year (8%). Those 
students who reported that they never attend church were the smallest group. (7.5%). 
Table. 1
Self-reported socio-demographic characteristics of participants (N=240)
Ch a ra cteri sti c, ri %
Denomination
Catholic 33 13.8
Lutheran 42 17.5
Episcopal 2 .8
Assembly of God 8 3.3
Methodist 7 2.9
Presbyterian 4 1.7
Covenant 3 1.3
Church of Christ 3 1.3
Congregational 2 .8
Evangelical 20 8.3
Bible 2 .8
Baptist 65 27.1
Islamic 2 .8
Hindu 2 .8
Non-Denominational 20 8.3
Inter-Denominational 1 .4
Not Applicable 7 2.9
Other 17 7.1
(Table 1 continues)
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(Table 1 continued)
Characteristic n %
Institution
Crown College 82 34.2
Pillsbury 49 20.4
Southwest State 109 45.4
Major
Communication 22 9.2
Psychology 26 10.8
Other Social Science 101 42.1
Other 91 37.9
Class
Freshman 107 44.6
Sophomore 66 27.5
Junior 39 16.3
Senior 26 10.8
Non-Traditional 2 .8
Gender
Male 109 45.4
Female 131 54.6
Church Attendance
Every Week 113 47.1
Almost Every Week 51 21.3
Several Times Per Year 21
oo 
oo
Occasionally 37 15,4
Never 18 7.5
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In order to simplify the testing of religious affiliation, the denominations were 
categorized into seven basic groups that are generally similar in methods of worship 
and church doctrine. The following table shows specifically how the denominations 
were re-grouped.
Table 2
Denominational Re-Grouping Based on Similar Doctrinal Position
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
Catholic Lutheran Methodist Baptist Evangelical Non-Denom Islamic
Episcop Presby Bible Inter-Denom Hindu
Church of Assembly of Not
Christ God Applic
Covenant
Congregation
There were 235 subjects who completed all five of the scales (rhetorical 
sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of control and religiosity). Means, 
standard deviations and reliability for the five scales are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for RHETSEN IRS. NS. RR) Locus of Control Inventory (LC) 
and Inventory of Religious Beliefs (REL) fN-235!
RS NS RR LC REL
Mean 33 .16 13 .26 6 .1 9 12 .36 63 . 51
Stand. Deviation 7 . 63 6 .17 3 . 6 3 .34 12 . 5
Minimum 4 0 0 1 23
Maximum 52 39 21 21 75
Alpha . 80 .77 . 60 . 57 . 95
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RQ1 asks if religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness and /or 
rhetorical reflectomess. Religiosity is negatively related to rhetorical sensitivity 
(r=-.234, p<.001) and positively related to rhetorical reflectomess (r=.269, p<.001); 
there was no significant relationship between religiosity and noble selfness (see Table 
4).
Table 4
Pearson Correlations between RS, NS, RR, LC, and REL
Source
RS NS RR LC REL
Rhetorical Sensitivity - . 847** - . 478** _ ]_74** - .234**
Sig. (2-Tailed) . 000 . 000 . 008 . 000
Noble Self - . 022 - .152* . 082
Sig. (2-Tailed) .737 . 021 .212
Rhetorical Reflector - . 051 .269**
Sig. (2-Tailed) .445 . 000
Locus of Control - . 092
Sig. (2-Tailed) .1 6 1
Religiosity
Sig. (2-Tailed)
*p<.05. **p<.01.
RQ2 asks if locus of control is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, 
and/or rhetorical reflectomess. Table 4 shows that locus of control is positively related 
to rhetorical sensitivity (r=.174, p=.008) and negatively related (r=-.152, p=. 021) to 
noble selfness; there was no significant relationship between locus of control and 
rhetorical reflectomess.
RQ3 asks if fundamentally religious college students differ from non or less
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religious college students in their levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, 
rhetorical reflectomess, and locus of control. The scores on the religiosity survey were 
divided into four groups ranging from the highest (or most) religious to the lowest (or 
least) religious. A one way ANOVA test was conducted comparing the means of, the 
four quartiles against the other constructs. Table 5 shows that there is significance 
between religiosity and rhetorical sensitivity (p<.001), noble selfness (p=.041) and 
rhetorical reflectomess (p=.001). No significance was found between religiosity and 
locus of control based on a comparison of means.
Table 5
One-way Analyses of Variance for four levels of religiosity
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity 
Between groups 
Within groups 
Noble Self
Between groups 
Within groups 
Rhetorical Reflector 
Between groups 
Within groups 
Locus of Control 
Between groups 
Within groups
3 377.63
227 49.66
3 101.35
227 49.66
3 71.24
227 11.91
3 14.12
227 11.06
7.6 .000
2.79 .041
5.98 .001
1.28 .283
(Table 5 continues)
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(Table 5 continued)
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Religiosity
Between groups 3 10975.57 699.59 . 000
Within groups 227 15.69
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests were done comparing the religious levels 
to the subscales of rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, and rhetorical reflector. For 
rhetorical sensitivity, the most religious (highest quartile) were significantly less 
rhetorically sensitive than the other three quartiles. For noble self, the significance was 
found between the lowest quartile (least religious) and the highest quartile (most 
religious). The lowest quartiles were less noble self than the highest. For rhetorical 
reflector, significance was discovered between the lowest half (least religious) and the 
highest half of the sample (most religious). The lowest half were less rhetorically 
reflective than the highest half. See Table 6.
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Table 6
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on religiosity
Religiosity Level n
Alpha
1
{ .05)
2
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Highest 62 30. 02
Medium High 59 33.22
Medium Low 53 33 .78
Lowest 57 36 .12
Noble Self
Lowest 57 12 .11
Medium Low 53 12 .47 12 .47
Medium High 59 13 .13 13 .13
Highest 62 15 . 01
Rhetorical Reflector 
Lowest 57 4 . 89
Medium Low 53 5 . 54
Medium High 59 6 . 85
Highest 62 7.26
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
RQ4 asks if levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical 
reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus of control. A stepwise regression 
test was conducted (see Tables 7-9) between the three RHETSEN (dependent variables) 
and the independent variables of locus of control and religiosity.
For rhetorical sensitivity (Table 7) the analysis showed that RS could be 
predicted by religiosity (df=2,224;(3=-.23; r2=5.5) and locus of control ((3 =.15,
r\
additional r =1.7). Thus the total amount of variance accounted for in predicting RS by 
religiosity and locus of control was 7.2%.
Noble self is predicted (Table 8) only by locus of control (df=l,225;
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(3=-14.7;r2=1.7). Although Locus of control is a predictor of noble selfness, it only 
accounts for 1.7% of the variance.
Rhetorical reflectomess is predicted (Table 9) by religiosity
(df=l,225;P.28;r2=7.1). This prediction accounts for 7.1% of the variance.
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Table 7
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Sensitivity 
Summary_______________________________
M odel R r7 A r2 Standard 
Error of 
Estimate
1 .243* . 059 . 055 7 .18
2 . 243b . 080 . 072 7 .11
Coefficients0
B SE t Sig.
1 (Constant) 42 .27 2 .47 17 .11 . 000
Religiosity - . 14 . 04 -  .24 -3.76 . 000
2 (Constant) 37 . 71 3 .16 11. 94 . 000
Religiosity -  .14 . 04 -  .23 -3 . 56 . 000
Locus of Control .33 . 14 . 15 2.28 . 024
ANOVA0
SS Df MS F Sig.
1 Regression 728.26 1 728.26 14 .14 . 000a
Residual 11584.65 225 51.49
Total 12312.91 226
2 Regression 991.14 2 495.57 9.81 . 000b
Residual 11321.77 224 50 . 54
Total 12312.91 226
a. Predictors: (Constant), REL
b. Predictors: (Constant),REL,LC
c. Dependent Variable RS
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Table 8
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Noble Self
Summary_______________________
M odel R R2 A r2 Standard 
Error of 
Estimate
1 . 147a . 0 2 2 . 017 6 . 07
B SE fi t Sig.
Coefficients13
1 (Constant) 16 . 61 1.56 10.71 . 0 0 0
Locus of 
Control
- .27 . 1 2 - .15
CMCM1 . 026
ANOVAb
SS Df MS F Sig.
1 Regression 184.32 1 184.32 5 .00 . 0 2  6 a
Residual 8299.83 225 51.49
Total 8484.14 226
a. Predictors: (Constant), LC
b. Dependent Variable NS
56
Table 9
Stepwise Regression Analysis for Rhetorical Reflector 
Summary______________________________
M odel R R? A r2 Standard 
Error of 
Estimate
1 . 27 5a . 075 . 071 3 .45
Coefficients0
B SE e t Sig.
1 (Constant) 1.20 1.19 1. 01 .316
Religiosity 7.88 . 02 .28 4.28 . 000
ANOVAc
SS Df MS F Sig.
1 Regression 218.62 1 218.62 18 .35 . 000a
Residual 2680.23 225 11. 91
Total 2898.86 226
a. Predictors: (Constant), REL
b. Dependent Variable RR
RQ5 asks if there is a difference in religiosity, locus of control, rhetorical 
sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio-demographic 
factors of school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church attendance and 
religious denomination. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) tests were run on all 
demographic variables except gender. Following the ANOVAs, post-hoc Student- 
Newman-Keuls tests were mn.
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The first test was run comparing the means of five constructs under 
investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of control, and 
religiosity) with where the students went to school (see Table 10).
Table 10
One-way Analyses of Variance for Institution Attended
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups 2 652.67 12 .29 . 000
Within groups 232 53 .12
Noble Self
Between groups 2 223.93 6 .14 . 003
Within groups 232 36 .47
Rhetorical Reflector
Between groups 2 82 . 64 6 . 69 . 001
Within groups 232 12 .35 .
Locus of Control
Between groups 2 44.17 4.07 . 018
Within groups 230 11. 06
Religiosity
Between groups 2 9348.5 121.48 . 000
Within groups 232 76 . 96
For rhetorical sensitivity and noble self, there is a significant difference between 
Pillsbury Baptist Bible College and students who attended either Crown or Southwest
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State. Pillsbury students were less rhetorically sensitive (see Table 11) and more noble 
self than students from the other two schools. For rhetorical reflector, students from 
Pillsbury were more rhetorical reflector than students from Southwest State. For locus 
of control, Pillsbury students had more internal locus of control than Crown or 
Southwest State students. For religiosity, Southwest State students were less religious 
than Crown or Pillsbury students.
Table 11
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Institution attended
Alpha (.05)
Institution n 1 2
Rhetorical Sensitivi 
Pillsbury 
Crown 
Southwest
Noble Self
Southwest
Crown
Pillsbury
Rhetorical Reflector 
Southwest 
Crown 
Pillsbury
Locus of Control 
Pillsbury 
Crown 
Southwest
Religiosity
Southwest
Crown
Pillsbury
48 28.75
80 32.33
107 35.02
107 12.39
80 12.79
48 28.75
107 5.36
80 6.51 6.51
48 7.50
48 11.19
80 12.53
107 12.85
107 53.64
80 70.48
48 73.12
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
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The second oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five 
constructs under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, 
locus of control, and religiosity) with the class position. Significance was observed 
between class and locus of control and between class and religiosity (p<.001) (see 
Table 12).
Table 12
One-way Analyses of Variance for Class Rank
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups 4 106.53 1. 86 .119
Within groups 230 57 .41
Noble Self
Between groups 4 44.38 1.17 .325
Within groups 230 37 . 96
Rhetorical Reflector
Between groups 4 19.20 1. 50 .204
Within groups 230 12 . 84
Locus of Control
Between groups 4 27 . 62 2 . 54 . 040
Within groups 228 10 . 86
Religiosity
Between groups 4 907.80 6 .34 . 000
Within groups 230 143.13
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For the construct of locus of control, post-hoc tests show that there is a 
significant difference between non-traditional students and all groups of traditional 
students. The non-traditional students were more internally controlled. It should be 
noted however, that there were only two non-traditional students. See table 13.
For the construct of religiosity there is a significant difference between non- 
traditional students and freshman, sophomore, and junior students. The non-traditional 
students were less religious than freshman, sophomore, and junior students, but again, 
there were only two non-traditional students. See Table 13.
Table 13
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Class Rank
Alpha (.05)
Rank n 1 2
Locus of Control
Non-Traditional
Freshman
Sophomore
Senior
Junior
2
104
64
26
37
8 . 0 0
1 1 . 87 
12 . 50
12 . 96
13 .3 5
Religiosity
Non-Traditional
Senior
Sophomore
Junior
Freshman
2
26
64
37
104
47 . 50 
55 .40 55 . 40 
6 1 . 3 9  
64 .16  
66 . 84
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
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The third oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five constructs 
under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of 
control, and religiosity) with chosen major (see Table 14). Significance was observed 
only between major and religiosity(p<.001).
Table 14
One-way Analyses of Variance for declared major.
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups 3 15 .28 .26 . 854
Within groups 231 58.81
Noble Self
Between groups 3 6.24 . 16 . 922
Within groups 231 38.49
Rhetorical Reflector
Between groups 3 17 .17 1.33 .265
Within groups 231 12 . 89
Locus of Control
Between groups 3 21.63 1.96 .120
Within groups 229 11. 01
Religiosity
Between groups 3 2184.78 16 . 83 . 000
Within groups 231 129.85
6 2
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests show religiosity amongst communication 
majors is significantly less than students who chose majors outside of Social Science 
disciplines. (See table 15). These two groups were also significantly less religious than 
students in Psychology or Social Science programs other than Communication or 
Psychology.
Table 15
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on declared major.
Maj or n
Alpha (.05) 
1 2 3
Religiosity
Communication 2 52 .41
Other 26 59 . 87
Other Social Sci 64 67 .30
Psychology 37 70.46
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
The fourth oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five 
constructs under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, 
locus of control, and religiosity) with the church attendance. Significance was 
observed between church attendance and rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, 
rhetorical reflectomess, and religiosity (see Table 16).
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Table 16
One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency of church attendance.
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups 4 323.13 6 . 02 . 000
Within groups 230 53 . 64
Noble Self
Between groups 4 92 .97 2 . 51 . 043
Within groups 230 37 .12
Rhetorical Reflector
Between groups 4 64.40 5 . 34 . 000
Within groups 230 12 . 05
Locus of Control
Between groups 4 20.79 1. 90 . 112
Within groups 228 10.98
Religiosity
Between groups 4 5249.84 77 . 64 . 000
Within groups 230 67 . 62
For rhetorical sensitivity, post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests show a 
difference that those who attend church either every week or occasionally are less 
rhetorically sensitive than those students who attend several times per year (see Table 
17). For noble self, tests show students who attend church several times per year were 
less noble self than those who attend occasionally. For rhetorical reflector, students
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who attend several times per year or never are less rhetorically reflective than students 
who attend occasionally.
Table 17
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance
Frequency n
Alpha I
1
: .05)
2
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Every Week 111 31.35
Occasionally 36 32 .22
Almost Every 50 34 .58 34. 58
Never 17 35.76 35.76
Several Times/year 21 38. 86
Noble Self
Several Times/year 21 10.62
Never 17 12 .12 12 .12
Almost Every 50 12 .24 12 .24
Every Week 111 13 .79 13 . 79
Occasionally 36 15 . 08
Rhetorical Reflector
Several Times/year 21 4 .10
Never 17 4.89
Almost Every 50 5 . 50 5 . 50
Every Week 111 5 .78
Occasionally 36 7 .19
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
For religiosity, post hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests revealed that students 
who never attended church were least religious of all groups, and students who attended 
several times a year or occasionally were less religious than those who attended almost 
every week or every week (see Table 18).
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Table 18
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on frequency of church attendance
Maj or n
Alpha (.05) 
1 2 3
Religiosity
Never 16 40 .31
Several Times/year 21 52 . 67
Occasionally 37 53 . 43
Almost Every 51 67 . 51
Every Week 110 70.48
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
The fifth oneway ANOVA test was run comparing the means of five constructs 
under investigation (rhetorical sensitivity, noble self, rhetorical reflector, locus of 
control, and religiosity) with the regrouped denominational affiliation. Significance 
was observed between denominational affiliation and religiosity. No significance was 
observed between affiliation and the remaining constructs (NS, RR, RS, LOC). (See 
Table 19.)
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Table 19
One-way Analyses of Variance for frequency based on denominational type
Variable and Source df MS F Sig.
Rhetorical Sensitivity
Between groups 6 150.69 2.7 . 015
Within groups 228 55 . 81
Noble Self
Between groups 6 63 .20 1.70 . 124
Within groups 228 37 .12
Rhetorical Reflector
Between groups 6 19.76 1.55 . 164
Within groups 228 12 . 77
Locus of Control
Between groups 6 12 . 51 1.13 .348
Within groups 226 11.11
Religiosity
Between groups 6 2321.09 23 . 39 . 000
Within groups 228 99.23
For denominational affiliation, post hoc Student-Newman-Keuls tests revealed 
that students that fell under the categories o f non-denominational, inter-denominational, 
Evangelical, Bible, Assembly of God, Covenant, Congregational, and Baptist were 
more religious than students who fell under the categories of Methodist, Presbyterian,
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Church o f Christ, Catholic, Episcopal, Islamic, Hindu, (or those whose selection was 
either “other” or “not-applicable.” (See Table 20.)
Table 20
Post-hoc Student-Newman-Keuls on Religiosity based on Denominational Type
Religious Type n
Alpha
1
(-05)
2
3 Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Church of Christ
13 53 .46
1 Catholic, Episcopal 35 55.43
7 Islamic, Hindu, 
Not-Applicable
28 56.46
2 Lutheran 42 56 . 67
6 Non-Denominational 
Inter-Denominational
21 70 . 05
5 Evangelical, Bible 
Assembly of God, 
Covenant, Congregational
32 70.34
4 Baptist 64 71.97
Note: Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
For gender, a t-test was conducted. The only significant finding based on this 
test showed that females do tend to be more religious than males (p=.029) (See Table 
21).
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Table 21
Independent samples t-test for gender
Levene's Test t-test for Means
Source F Sig. t df Sig.(2-tailed)
RS .42 .519 -1.82 233 .071
NS 1.82 .519 1.84 233 .068
RR 1.68 .519 1.03 233 .306
LC .46 .519 -1.32 231 .189
REL 10.00 .519 -2.20 233 .029*
*p<.05 Note: Equal variances assumed.
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Chapter 4 
Discussion
Research Question 1 asked if  religiosity is related to rhetorical sensitivity, noble 
selfness, and/or rhetorical reflectomess. There was a significant relationship 
discovered between religiosity and rhetorical sensitivity and between religiosity and 
rhetorical reflectomess, but not between religiosity and noble selfness. Research 
Question 3 analyzes these relationships in more detail, but it appears that a negative 
relationship does appear between rhetorical sensitivity and a positive relationship exists 
between religiosity and rhetorical reflectomess. In other words, the more religious a 
subject reported being, the less rhetorically sensitive she or he tended to be. 
Conversely, those same students (higher religious) do tend to be more rhetorically 
reflective.
At this point it is feasible to revisit the concept that Fulkerson (1986) suggested; 
that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical sensitivity. When the Apostle Paul said, “I 
have become all things to all men” (I Cor. 9:22 RSV), it now seems more like an 
encouragement to be rhetorically reflective. Look again at how Darnell and 
Brockriede (1976) described Rhetorical Reflectomess: (a) They have no self to call 
their own. (b) They make their choices based on the perceived need of the other 
person, (c) They are acted upon rather than act, and (d) They are predictable based on 
the behavior of the other or upon the situation. If people who score near or at the 
highest level of religiosity are following the same mantra, they are not only predictable 
and making decisions based on perceived need, but they have given up their own “se lf5
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and have done so willingly. It then makes sense that they score low on the rhetorical 
sensitivity scale. Recall the first tenant of the rhetorically sensitive person (Hart, 
Carlson, & Eadie, 1980). The tenant suggests that sensitive people see themselves as 
having many “selves” from which to draw. Perhaps highly religious people, who have 
“died to se lf’ perceive the Great Commission and/or Holy Spirit as the basic 
manifestation of their rhetoric. With enough indoctrination and “groupthink,” the 
results discovered from Research Question 1 make sense. Perhaps Fulkerson should 
have stated that the Bible actually encourages rhetorical reflectomess, not rhetorical 
sensitivity.
In addition to indoctrination at the collegiate level, the students at Pillsbury 
share a culture that extends beyond the campus. The culture is fostered from youth and 
exposure to ideals in contrast to the “latent” dogma is rare. It is no wonder why scores 
in religiosity decline with class rank. Another aspect of the culture comes from a 
concern for appearance (or perceptions). The need to be accepted within the culture is 
a strong influence on behavior and may contribute to attitudes toward encoding 
messages.
Research Question 2 asked if locus of control is related to rhetorical sensitivity, 
noble selfness and/or rhetorical reflectomess. Because of the unique samples of 
students studied, the modified Gabbard, Howard, Tageson (1986) locus of control was 
used. The reliability score on this measurement was low. Gabbard et al. discovered 
that when giving Rotter’s (1966) IE measurement to fundamentally religious groups, 
references to luck or chance may lead to answers in contradiction to how they really
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felt. A new measurement replacing reference to luck with religious vocabulary helped 
to make fundamental samples more reliable. The authors also came up with a “neutral” 
revision. Because the research in this present study sampled both fundamental and 
non-fundamental students, the choice to use the “neutral” revision was made. It is 
difficult to say if  the religious-revision would have made a difference in the reliability 
score. According to Gabbard, Howard and Tageson (1986), a strong case “can be made 
for utilizing the neutral revision in both general and fundamental populations”(p.306). 
The results presented in this thesis must be tempered because of the low reliability of 
the scale.
For Research Question 2 it appears that the more noble self a student reported 
being, the more internal the locus of control appears. A significant correlation also 
appears between rhetorical sensitivity and external locus of control.
It is entirely logical that the more noble self one is, the more internal one is. 
Darnell and Brockriede (1976) suggested several characteristics of the Nobel Self. The 
one characteristic that now stands out relating to these results is that noble selves have a 
unitary view of self. With a mindset based on centrality, the noble self sees no other 
person, factor, or force responsible for things that happen to him or her. The noble self 
tends to not share choices. For a noble self to regard outside forces as a mechanism for 
alterations in life’s course internal conflict would certainly result.
Conversely we see that rhetorical sensitive students in this study tended to be 
external in their orientation. We know that rhetorically sensitive individuals have 
multiple “selves” from which to choose when engaging in dyadic exchanges.
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Rhetorically sensitive people are open systems that are constantly making decisions 
based on perceived information. For a rhetorically sensitive person to externalize (or 
accept from outside self) information that leads to decision making is consistent with 
previous research and with the results of the Pearson correlations run for this present 
study.
Research Question 3 asked if fundamentally religious college students differ 
from non or less religious college students in their levels of rhetorical sensitivity, noble 
selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess and locus of control. The answer is yes, there are 
significant relationships between all three RHETSEN scales (none with locus of 
control). The results are generally consistent with what was discovered in Research 
Question 1. The highest quartile students on the religiosity survey were the lowest RS. 
As mentioned, the fundamental subjects in this sample appear to share a common “se lf5 
and the concept of “multiple selves” as is a tenant in rhetorical sensitivity is not a 
tendency. Consistent findings again appear that show that the highest half on the 
religiosity survey were the most rhetorically reflective. This is a profound discovery, 
but there is not a way, based on this research, to know why this is happening. As 
mentioned above, it could be because of a shared mindset, but how is that mindset 
developed? In the introduction to this thesis it was mentioned that there are unlimited 
factors that lead one toward a particular religious mind-set. The findings of this study 
echo that concept.
The results also showed a less significant discovery that was unexpected and in 
some ways contradicts the previous findings. The lowest quartile on the religiosity
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survey were significantly less noble self than the highest religiosity quartile. This 
finding certainly needs further study, as speculation here extends beyond the empirical 
nature of the results.
Based on a stepwise regression, both religiosity and locus of control are 
predictors of rhetorical sensitivity when added together, and account for 7.2% of at the 
variance. However, locus of control only adds 1.7%, so religiosity alone predicts 5.5%. 
This result is consistent with the findings in previous research questions. However, it 
should be noted that the review of literature revealed that there are literally hundreds of 
ways to measure religion, so it would not be accurate to state that religiosity in general 
is a predictor. It would probably be more accurate to state that scoring high on the 
“Inventory of Religious Beliefs” is a predictor of rhetorical sensitivity. Of course this 
is true of all of the findings in this study, but it is probably most appropriate to mention 
here.
The same religiosity is also a predictor of rhetorical reflectomess. This 
relationship alone (without the benefit of locus of control) accounts for 7.1% of the 
variance. The significance discovered here may serve as a catalyst into further 
research. There are enough tenants and/or characteristics of similar nature between 
rhetorical reflectomess and the type of religiosity studied here that predictions are 
possible and a hypothesis could certainly be written.
Noble self is not predictable based on religiosity. However, there is a difference 
between the highest and lowest religiosity quartiles on noble selfness. As mentioned
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above, noble selves tend to be internal. Perhaps there are ego-related issues o f the very 
religious and very non-religious that “come into play”.
Research Question 4 asks if  levels o f rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and 
rhetorical reflectomess can be predicted by religiosity and locus of control. RS is 
predicted by religiosity and locus of control, NS is predicted only by locus of control, 
and RR is predicted by religiosity. It should be pointed out here that there are certainly 
other variables that can affect these predictions. According to Hart, Carlson & Eadie 
(1980) “certain social institutions (like churches, cities, colleges, and political parties) 
may foster certain communicative predispositions” (p.4). In other words, it is likely 
that there is more than a religious ideology at work here.
Research Question 5 asks if  there a difference in religiosity, locus of control, 
rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess based on the socio­
demographic factors o f school attended, year in school, gender, degree major, church 
attendance, and religious denomination.
Because the three schools sampled in this study are “fundamentally” different, 
some of the significance discovered can certainly be attributed to the nature of cultures 
present at each of the institutions. For instance, it was discovered that Pillsbury 
students were less rhetorically sensitive. It has also been shown that Pillsbury students 
were the most religious according to the religiosity measurement given (see Table 11). 
The translation becomes redundant.
Another example also comes from Table 11. This result shows that Pillsbury 
students were also the most noble self. This was also shown in the discussion of
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Research Question 3 because here again the Pillsbury students were the most religious. 
Again, we see that Pillsbury students are more rhetorical reflector for the same reasons. 
Virtually all tests based on school are synonymous with findings based on level of 
religiosity, even the tests that only compare locus of control. Crown College appears in 
the middle on every Student-Newman-Kuels test run comparing schools. This is 
indicative of the cultures present at each institution.
The next socio-demographic comparison was class. The two tests that showed 
significance placed non-traditional students as significantly different from all other 
classes. Since there were only two non-traditional students it would not be appropriate 
to speculate what is happening here. It should be enough to simply suggest that non- 
traditional students (or for that matter, non-students) may be of interest for future study.
Following class was the socio-demographic of chosen major. Although there 
was a difference shown between majors based on religiosity, it should be noted that 
Pillsbury did not have a specific communication major. Because religiosity is so 
closely tied to institution, the findings here are not conclusive.
The next socio-demographic comparison was church attendance. Table 18 
shows that there is a progression directly correlating church attendance and religiosity. 
This is not only expected based on research, but it has face validity. In other words, it 
is logical that it would turn out this way. It also helps us accept the other tests that were 
not quite as expected.
For rhetorical sensitivity, the students who attended church every week were the 
least rhetorically sensitive. This finding, once again, is consistent with the other
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research questions. But what wasn’t expected is that the next group who were low in 
RS were the students who only attended church occasionally. But even more 
interesting was that the most rhetorically sensitive students were those who indicated 
that they attend church several times per year. It is possible that “several times per 
year” is a matter of perception. For some people “several times per year” could mean 
two or three times, or for that matter it could mean even more frequently than “every 
week”. In order to draw specific conclusions about RS and church attendance, a more 
specific question about frequency needs to be asked.
The same group that scored highest on RS (several times per year group) also 
scored lowest on the noble self scale. Those who attend church occasionally scored the 
highest on noble self. Again, without defining church attendance more specifically, it 
is difficult to speculate what that means.
Despite the vague nature o f the frequency demographic, the most interesting 
finding was that students who attended church only occasionally were the highest 
rhetorical reflectors. Based on previous findings, this result is not expected. Also 
unexpected was the fact that the “never” group and the “several times” group scored 
the lowest on the RR scale. Because there was such a strong relationship between 
religiosity and RR, and because there was a strong relationship between religiosity and 
church attendance, the finding here is puzzling.
The next socio-demographic is denominational affiliation. Students were given 
many options and asked to choose the affiliation that comes closest to what they 
considered themselves. The options were condensed according to generally similar
77
denominations. Students that identified themselves under non or inter-denominational, 
Evangelical, Bible, Assembly of God, Covenant, Congregational, or Baptist scored at 
least 70 (out of a maximum of 75) on the “Inventory of Religious Beliefs”. All of the 
other denominational affiliations scored in the mid 50s. This is a significant difference 
but was expected. The “Inventory of Religious Beliefs” was able to isolate the 
extremely fundamental group from the lessor or non-fundamental groups. This 
isolation becomes very visible in this socio-demographic comparison. It is interesting 
to note however, that students who associated themselves as “not applicable,” Islamic, 
or Hindu did not score the lowest on the religiosity scale. This group was classified as 
the third from the bottom. This was not expected and suggests that some other factor 
be at work in regard to these positions.
The final socio-demographic comparison that was done had to do with gender. 
There was only one relationship that showed significance. It was discovered that in this 
particular group females tend to score slightly higher on the religiosity scale. This 
finding is consistent with much research.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
Implications, If religiosity (as defined in this study) and scores on the RHETSEN
instrument, particularly the rhetorical reflector scale share some of the 
same attitudinal mind sets, perhaps we are one step closer to developing a 
way to measure religiosity without using religious vocabulary. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, we can only take a snap
shot of where someone resides in his or her mindset. What we don’t see is
how someone got to where they are. The relationships discovered in this
research serve to give us greater insight into the attitudinal foundation 
that makes up a person. Knowing that there are significant relationships 
between these constructs helps us to understand a little bit more about
attitudes that make up a person.
Limitations. Although this study revealed some very interesting results, there were also 
some limitations. One limitation is that the reliability alpha score for the locus of 
control measurement was only .57. Rotter’s (1966) initial I-E scale has had a large 
gamut of reliability scores when used in studies, and some of them have been on the 
low side. By using the modified neutral scale amongst a population that is so extremely 
fundamental rather than the “fundamental version” the risk was run of obtaining a 
lower reliability score. The obvious question now is: “would the religious version have 
resulted in a higher reliability?” Fortunately the majority of the significance discovered 
in this study focused more on religiosity rather than locus of control.
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Another limitation of this study has to do with the nature or culture of a group 
of students who were so fundamental. Even though there was a good reliable measure 
of religiosity, there are cultural norms in this group of students that just could not be 
measured. Religiosity was measured, however the mindset that accompanies this 
fundamentalism was nurtured well before these students arrived at college. Religiosity 
is only the “wonderama” (...a  shoebox with a hole cut to allow one to peek in on a 
crafted scene) that suggests a much bigger picture.
Another limitation is related to the construct of religiosity itself. The Brown 
and Lowe (1951) Inventory of Religious Beliefs was very reliable in measuring a 
certain type of religiosity. On this measurement Baptist students scored very high and 
all other denominations scored lower. There are literally hundreds of different 
measurements available that would have shifted the scores around dramatically. The 
goal of this research was to isolate one type and examine that group against the 
remaining students in that sample. By doing this isolation we are blinded to 
possibilities outside of the way this measurement was configured. The unique sample 
of students also ironically skews the results by having a disproportionate number of 
Christians who participated.
There was also a limit in some of the sample sizes. For instance, there were two 
significant results that were obtained on non-traditional students versus the rest of the 
class. It happens to be that the sample size of the non-traditional students was only 
two. I would caution any conclusion drawn from such a small sample.
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Another limitation of this study comes from the geographic location. What was 
learned can only be generalized with caution since a good number of the students 
sampled were from rural (small towns) around Minnesota. Geographical demographic 
information was not asked, thus some assumptions are made here.
Finally it was discovered that the socio-demographic question of church 
attendance could be too vague. Some puzzling findings based on frequency of church 
attendance have led to this suggestion.
Recommendations fo r  Future Study. The results obtained in this study have brought to
the surface some potential future research ideas. Since the rhetorical reflector
\
measurement is so directly correlated to highly fundamental college students, this 
particular group should be studied further. One particular suggestion would be to move 
the same study beyond college students. If indeed there is a mindset that reaches 
beyond religiosity, the scores should be very comparable.
Because this study used only one type of religiosity measurement, a future study 
should explore other types.
This study was done to further understand the communication construct of 
rhetorical sensitivity. In doing so however we learned about the psychological 
construct of locus of control as well as the construct of religiosity. The particular 
groups of extremely fundamental students have now sparked the suggestion of using 
the same type of population and then explore other communication theories. More 
needs to be done with this population to explore other attributes, which are native to
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this population. Rhetorical sensitivity, noble selfness, and rhetorical reflectomess are 
indeed a great place to start.
8 2
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Appendix A 
Communication Survey
Please respond to each statement listed below individually. There are no 
absolutely right nor absolutely wrong answers. For each statement, please 
indicate your opinion by choosing one o f  the five responses.
1. People should always be frank and spontaneous in conversation.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
2. An idea can be communicated in many different ways.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
3. When talking to someone with whom you disagree, you should always feel obligated to state 
your opinion.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
4. A person should always laugh at an unfunny joke just to please the joke-teller.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
5. It’s good to follow the rule: before blowing your top, sleep on the problem.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
6. When talking to others, you should drop all your defenses.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
7. It is better to hide one’s true feelings in order to avoid hurting others.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
8. No matter how hard you try, you just can’t make friends with everyone.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
9. One should keep quiet rather than alienate others.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
10. You should share your joys with your closest friends.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
11. It is acceptable to discuss religion with a stranger.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
12. A supervisor in a work situation must be forceful in his or her communication with 
subordinates to be effective.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
13. A person should tell it like it is.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
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14. “Look before you leap” is the most important rule to follow when talking to others.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
15. You should tell a friend if you think he or she is making a mistake.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
16. The first thing that comes to mind is the best thing to say.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
17. When conversing, you should tell others what they want to hear.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
18. When someone dominates a conversation, it is important to interrupt them in order to state your 
opinion.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
19. When angry, a person should say nothing rather than say something he or she will be sorry for
later.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
20. When someone has an irritating habit, they should be told about it.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
21. When talking to your friends, you should adjust your remarks to suit them.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
22. You really can’t put a sugar coating on bad news.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
23. A person who speaks his or her gut feelings is to be admired.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
24. You shouldn’t make a scene in a restaurant by arguing with the waiter.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
25. Putting thoughts into words exactly the way you want them is a difficult 
process.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
26. A friend who has bad breath should be told about it.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
27. If you're sure that you are right, you should argue with the one who disagrees with you.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
28. If people would open up to each other the world would be a better place.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
29. There is a difference between the person who is being “diplomatic” and one who is “two-faced.”
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
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30. You should tell someone if they are about to embarrass themselves.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
31. One should not be afraid to voice his or her own opinions.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
32. If  your boss doesn’t like you, there is not much you can do about it.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
33. You should tell someone if you thing they are giving bad advice.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
34. Saying what you think is a sign of friendship.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
35. When you are sure that you are right, you should press your point until you win the argument.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
36. “If you feel it, say it” is a good rule to follow in conversation.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
37. If a man cheats on his wife, he should tell her.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
38. It is better to speak your gut feelings than to beat around the bush.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
39. We should have a kind word for the people we meet in life.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
40. One should treat all people in the same way.
Almost Always True Frequently True Sometimes True Infrequently True Almost Never True
RS Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,4,5,7,9,11,13,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,23,24,26,27,28,30, 31,33,34,35,37,38, and 
39 where a “C” response is given a value of 2, a “B” or “D” response is given a value of 1, and “A” or 
“E” response is given a value of 0.
NS Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,11,13,15,16,18,20,23,26,27,28,30,31,33,34,35, and 38 where “A” = 2, 
“B” = 1, and “C”, “D”, and “E” all equal 0, plus items 4,5,7,9,17, and 21 where “E” = 2, “D”= l, and 
“A”, “B”, and “C” all equal 0.
RR Scale:
Score = total of items 1,3,12,13,15,16,18,20,23,26,27,28,30,33,34,35, and 38 where “E” = 2, 
“D” =1, and “A”, “B”, and “C” all equal 0, plus items 4,5,7,9,17,19, and 24 where “A” = 2, “B” = 1, and 
“C”, “D” and “E” all equal 0.
For normative data regarding these scores refer to Hart, R.P., Carlson, R.E., & Eadie, W.F. (March 
1980). Attitudes toward Communication and the Assessment of Rhetorical Sensitivity, Communication 
Monographs, 47, 1-22.
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Appendix B 
Locus of Control Inventory
The following survey is a series of statements in pairs. For each number, 
circle the letter of the statement that you believe is the most true, even if  you don’t 
agree with either of the statements. There are no right or wrong answers.
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy on them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to powerful others,
b. People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t take enough interest in
politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental
happenings.
6. a. Without providential forces one cannot become an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you.
b. People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one’s personality,
b. It is one’s experiences in life which determine what they’re like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b. Trusting providence has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a 
definite course of action.
94
10. a. In the case o f the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test,
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really
useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, no other powerful forces are at work,
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do
about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of
good or bad fortune anyhow.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good,
b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with other powerful forces,
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by relying on powerful others.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was fortunate enough to be in the right
place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends on ability: powerful other forces have little or
nothing to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most o f us are the victims o f forces we can neither
understand, or control.
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.
18. a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by happenings which
they can’t understand, 
b. There really is no such thing as providence or fortune.
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes,
b. It is usually best to cover up one’s mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
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21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give,
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that providence or the will of powerful others play an
important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly.
b. There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the directions my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave die way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level.
A answers on:
Questions 2,6,7,9,16,17,18,20,21,23,25,& 29 reflect external orientation.
Questions 3,4,5,10,11,12,13,15,22,26, & 28 reflect internal orientation.
Filler questions are questions 1,8,14,19,24, & 27
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Appendix C 
Inventory of Religious Belief
This is a study of religious belief. Below are fifteen items which are to be 
answered in the following manner: Circle Strongly Agree if  you agree 
strongly with the statement. Circle Agree if you agree with the statement.
Circle Not Sure if  you are in doubt as to whether you agree or disagree with 
the statement. Circle Disagree if you disagree with the statement. Circle 
Strongly Disagree if  you disagree strongly with the statement. Remember to 
read each statement carefully, and mark only one answer for each item.
People differ widely in their beliefs: Please indicate your own in the manner described.
1. It makes no difference whether one is a Christian or not as long as one has good will for others.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
2. I believe the Bible is the inspired Word o f God.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree
3. God created man separate and distinct from animals.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree
4. The idea of God is unnecessary in our enlightened age.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree
5. There is no life after death. 
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure
6. I believe Jesus was bom of a Virgin.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure
7. God exists as: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
8. The Bible is full of errors, misconceptions and contradictions.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree
9. The Gospel of Christ is the only way for mankind to be saved.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree
10. I think there have been many men in history just as great as Jesus.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
11. I believe there is a heaven and a hell.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
12. Eternal life is the gift of God only to those who believe in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. 
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
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13. I think a person can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
14. In many ways the Bible has held back and retarded human progress.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
15. I believe in the personal, visible return of Christ to the earth.
Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly Disagree
High religiosity is indicated by answering Strongly Disagree on Questions 
1,4,5,8,10,13,&14 and Strongly Agree on Questions 
2,3,6,7,9,11,12,15
Appendix D 
Socio-Demographic Survey
A study in Communication 
College Student Survey
You are being asked to participate in a study of communication and beliefs. You will remain anonymous. 
The survey is in three parts with a slightly different format for each part. Please read each statement 
carefully and follow the directions on each survey. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply 
looking for trends in general beliefs among college students. Please do not leave any question blank. If 
in doubt, circle the answer that comes closest to the way you feel. Your participation in this survey is 
strictly voluntary. It should take approximately 25-30 minutes to complete all three surveys. When you 
are finished with your survey your instructor or survey representative will collect it.
Before you begin, please indicate the following:
Major
Circle one answer in each o f  the following—
Gender:
Male Female
Year in school:
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Other or Non-Trad
How often do you attend church?
Every week Almost every week Several times per year Occasionally Never 
Choose the closest Church affiliation:
Catholic Lutheran Episcopal Assembly of God
Mormon Methodist Presbyterian Jehovah’s Witness
Southern Baptist Covenant Church of Christ Congregational
Seventh Day Evangelical Bible Baptist
Jewish Islamic Buddhist Scientist
Unitarian Hindu
Non-Denominational Interdenominational Not Applicable
Other
Inquiries about this survey may be sent to: Paul Hartzell (763) 560-1773 or mockdata@aol.com
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Institutional Review Board 
Approval Letter
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March 7, 2003
Paul Hartzell
Dept, of Communication, ASH 108 
UNO - VIA COURIER
JRB#; 097-03-EX
TITL€ OF PROTOCOL; Relationship Between Rhetorical Sensitivity. Locus of 
Control and Religiosity Among College Students
Dear Mr. Hartzalf.
The IRB has reviewed your Exemption Form for the above-tilled research project. 
According to the information provided, this project is exempt under 45 CFR 46:101b. 
category 2 . You are therefore authorized to begin the research.
It is understood this project wifi be conducted in full accordance with ail applicable 
sections of the IRB Guidelines. It is also understood that the IRB will be immediately 
notified of any proposed changes that may affect the exempt status of your research 
project.
Please be advised that the IRB has a maximum protocol approval period of three years 
from the original date of approval a nd release. If this study continues beyond the three 
year approval period, the project must be resubmitted in order to maintain an active 
approval status.
Sincerely,
Ernest D. Prentice, Ph.D.
Co-Chair, IRB
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